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A b s t r act
The problem addressed is given a group composed of N
individuals and given a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function for each individual in the group, how can these be
aggregated to obtain a group von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. The implications of a set of axioms, analogous to
Arrow's, using individual cardinal utilities--as opposed to
Arrow's ordinal rankings--are investigated. The result is
a group cardinal utility function which explicitly requires
interpersonal comparison of preference. Suggestions for who
should make these comparisons and how they might be done are
given.
1. Introduction
How should a group of individuals choose among a set of
alternatives? Certainly there are a host of possible answers
here ranging from formal aggregation schemes to informal dis-
cussion until a concensus emerges. The general problem--
sometimes referred to as the social welfare problem--has
drawn much attention from economists, sociologists, political
scientists, etc.
The problem is often formalized along the following lines.
M}.... ,2,= 1,
N, must collectively... ,i = 1, 2,A set of N individuals I.,
1
select an alternative a. from the set A = {a., j
J J
It is assumed that each individual I. can articulate his pre-
1
ferences, denoted by P ..
1
For instance, P. could be a ranking
1
of the M alternatives, or it could be a preference structure
such as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over the
set of possible consequences of the alternatives, or it could
be expected utilities associated with the alternatives. The
problem is to obtain the group preferences PG given the
individual preferences P., i = 1, 2, ... , N.
1
Thus, a function
f is needed such that
(1)
The usual approach has been to put reasonable restrictions on
the manner in which the P. are combined, and then derive the
1
implications this places on f. For instance, one such
restriction might be if Pi = P for all i, then P G = P, the
common individual preference.
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There are two versions of the problem formalized by (1)
which are of interest in this paper. These will be referred
to as the benevolent dictator problem and the participatory
group problem. In the former case, the aggregation rule,
that is the f in (1), is externally imposed by some individual--
the benevolent dictator. In the participatory group, the group
itself must internally generate the aggregation rule for
selecting a best group alternative. The theoretical development
is the same for both of these versions of the "social welfare
problem," however the necessary input assessments needed to
implement the results must be obtained in different manners.
In section 2, we briefly summarize aspects of Arrow's
[1951. 1963J work on the social welfare problem. His formula-
His resulttian used the P. as rankings of the alternatives.
1
is that, in general, there is no f which satisfies five
"reasonable" assumptions; and hence, the assumptions are
incompatible. Arrow's formulation, since it used rankings,
did not incorporate any concepts of strength of preference
nor did it attempt to interpersonally compare preferences.
Harsanyi [1955] was among the first to investigate assumptions
leading to a group von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Recently. Sen [1970] has shown that formulations with the
structure of (1) require interpersonal comparison of utility
in order to achieve a group preference for all possible sets
of individual preferences.
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This paper tries to formulate the group decision problem
in a manner analogous to Arrow except that the individual
preferences P. are utilities of the alternatives in the von
1
Neumann-Morgenstern sense. In our model, we first assume the
alternatives have certain known consequences. Uncertainties
are then explicitly introduced in section 4. It is argued in
section 3 that given five assumptions analogous to Arrow's,
using cardinal utilities rather than rankings, it is always
possible to define consistent aggregation rules for group
cardinal utility function. Specific classes of such rules,
which explicitly require interpersonal comparison of preference,
are investigated in section 4. Suggestions for obtaining the
necessary assessments to utilize these aggregation rules are
given in section 5.
2. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Perhaps the best known work on group preferences 1S
Arrow's [1951]. He proves that, 1n general, there is no
procedure for obtaining a group ordering (i.e. ranking) of
the various alternatives, call this PG, based on individual
group members orderings P. that is ccnsistent with five
1
seemingly reasonable assumptions. Thus, there 1S no f
satisfying (1) when the P. 's are rankings that is consistent
1
with these five conditions:
Assumption AI. There are at least two individual members in
the group, at least three alternatives, and
(ii)
Assumption A2.
Assumption A3.
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a group ordering is specified for all possible
individual member's orderings.
If the group ordering indicates alternative a
is preferred to alternative b for a certain
set of individual orderings, then the group
ordering must imply a is preferred to b if:
(i) the individual's orderings of alter-
natives other than a are not changed, and
each individual's ordering between a and
any other alternative either remains
unchanged or is modified in favor of a.
If an alternative is eliminated from consider-
ation, the new group ordering for the remaining
alternatives should be equivalent to the
original group ordering for these same alter-
natives.
Assumption A5.
ｾ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ A4. For each pair of alternatives a and b, there
is some set of individual orderings such that
the group prefers a to b.
There is no individual with the property that
whenever he prefers alternative a to b, the
group will also prefer a to b regardless of the
other individual's orderings.
Luce and Raiffa [19571 examine the reasonableness of these
assumptions and suggest that Assumption A3, referred to as
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption is the
weakest of the five.
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The problem arises from interpreting
(or misinterpreting) an individual's strength of preference
of one alternative over another based on that individual's
ranking of alternatives. In the next two sections, our
formulation explicitly utilizes individual's strength of
preferences and avoids this particular difficulty.
3. A Cardinal Utility Axiomatization
The specific problem addressed is as follows. For each
individual!., i = 1,2, ... , N, we are given the set of
1
cardinal utilities u.(a.) of the alternatives a., j = 1, 2,
1 J J
M. We wish to obtain a set of group cardinal utilities
uG(a.) from the u.(a.) consistent with five assumptions
, J 1 J
... ,
analogous to Arrow's. For decision purposes, the best group
alternative is the one associated with the highest group
utility. In terms of (1), the problem is to find a u such that
(2)
that is consistent with five axioms:
Assumption Bl.
Assumption B2.
There are at least two individual members in
the group, at least two alternatives, and group
utilities are specified for all possible
individual member's utilities.
If the group utilities indicate alternative a
is preferred to alternative b for a certain
set of individual utilities, then the group
utilities must imply a is preferred to b if:
(i)
(ii)
Assumption B3.
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the individual's utilities of alternatives
other than a are not changed, and
each individual's utilities for a either
remains unchanged or is increased.
If an alternative is eliminated from consider-
Assumption B4.
Assumption B5.
ation, the new group utilities for the remain-
ing alternatives should be equivalent to the
original group utilities for these same
alternatives.
For each pair of alternatives a and b, there
is some set of individual utilities such that
the group prefers a to b.
There is no individual with the property that
whenever he prefers alternative a to b, the
group will also prefer a to b regardless of the
other individual's utilities.
As can be seen, the main distinction--and the only relevant
one--between these assumptions and Arrow's is the substitution
of group and individual utilities for his group and individual
orderings. The interesting result is that there are many
possible forms of u in (2) which satisfy Assumptions Bl - B5,
whereas there were no f's in (1) consistent with Arrow's
Assumptions Al - AS. In the next section we will investigate
some specific functional forms for combining the individual
utilities which satisfy Assumptions Bl - BS. Here we will
informally talk through properties of such forms to indicate
that in fact some do exist.
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••• , u ), the critical property
. n
which must be satisfied by the group cardinal utility function
u in order to be consistent with Assumptions Bl - B5 is
au
au.
1
> 0, i = I, 2, ••• , N • (3)
To illustrate, consider the special case where
••• , u ) =
n
N
L
i=l
k. u. ,
1 1
k. > 0,
1
i = 1, 2, ••• , N • (4)
We could first scale all the individual cardinal utilities for
the alternatives from zero to one*. To assess the scaling
constants--the k. 's in (4)--requires interpersonal comparison
1
of utility. In the benevolent dictator problem, this compari-
son is done by the benevolent dictator himself, whereas in
the participatory group problem, it is done by the group as a
whole. We will return to this problem in section 5. For now,
let us assume that u in (4) has been assessed.
simple to verify that in fact (3) is satisfied.
It is then
Let us check the basic assumptions. Bl is triviallY
satisfied by (4). Because (3) is satisfied, Assumption B2 is
also satisfied. Increasing an individual's utility for alter-
native a can only increase the group's utility. Assumption B3
is a little more involved. As shown in section 5, selecting
values for the k. 's in (4) is dependent only on the alternatives
. 1
for which the u. 's are zero or one. However, we have already
1
assessed the k. 's and we will not change these, even if the
1 .
alternatives associated with a utility of either zero or one
*Note that this assumes that the utilities of each of the
individuals arc bounded.
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for any individual are deleted. Hence. clearly if an alter-
native is dropped from consideration, the group utility of those
remaining will not be affected. Thus, the new group utilities
for the remaining alternatives are equivalent to--in this case
they are identical to--the original group utilities for these
same alternatives. It also is the case that if a new alternative
is added to the list. it may have negative utility or a utility
greater then one for some of the individuals given the scaling
we have previously established. This is fine. and again. it
will not affect the group utilities for the original alternatives.
If each of the individuals prefer alternative a to
alternative b. the group must prefer a to busing (4) so
Assumption B4 is satisfied. Assumption B5 is also satisfied
by (4) because there is obviously some small amount E such
that if individual I. prefers a to b by a utility margin of E. and
ｾ
also if all the other individuals prefer b to a. then alter-
native b will be preferred to a by the group as a whole.
Although the reasoning is a bit more involved. one can similarly
check to see that any group utility. function consistent with
(3) will satisfy the Assumptions Bl - B5.
4. Some Specific Cardinal Utility Functions
We have established that group cardinal utility function
consistent with Assumptions Bl - B5 do exist. The arguments
of these functions are different individual's cardinal
-9-
utilities of certain alternatives. Let us now expand our
problem to include uncertain alternatives*, that is, an
alternative can now indicate which of the a. 's may result
J
and the associated probabilities, which will be denoted p ..
J
In general, the different individuals associated with
a particular problem may be in disagreement about the values
of the p. ' s for any particular alternative. In this paper,
J
we wi 11 simply skip this important issue and address those
problems where there is agreement on the probabilities .
We have not ruled
... , M, and the probabilities
isfor this alternative
Thus, given uG(a.), a. = 1,2,
J J
Pj for any uncertain ｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｾ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｌ the expected group utility
L uG(a.)·p ..
i=l J J
out the possibility that M is infinite, and in this case the
summation is simply replaced by an integral sign.
We want to look at axiomatizations which satisfy Assump-
tions Bl - B5. Consider the additional assumption which can
be stated as
Assumption Cl. In situations where the utilities of N-l of
the individual's are fixed for two alter-
. h '1" f h th. d' 'd 1nat1ves, t e Ut1 1t1es 0 teN 1n 1V1 ua
shall guide the group decisions.
In a little more technical terms, we could say that Assumption Cl
implies that if u l ' ... , u i - l ' u i + l ' '." UN are fixed at any
level and alternatives are considered which differ only in u.,
1
then the alternative with the highest mathematical expectation
*For this interpretation, it may be more convenient to
think of the certain alternatives as being tautological to
the consequences which they imply.
for u. should be chosen.
ｾ
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Since u is to be a group cardinal
utility function, Assumption Cl also implies that with u l '
... , u i - l ' u i + l ' •.. , uN fixed, if alternative a leads to a
probability distribution p (u.) and alternative b leads to a
a ｾ
probability distribution Pb(u i ), the group utility function
should be such that the expected group utility of a is greater
than that of b if and only if the expected utility of a to
individual I. is greater than his expected utility of b.
ｾ
Thus, since utility functions are unique up to positive
linear transformation (von Neumann and Morgerstern [1953]),
u must be linear in each of the u. so Assumption Cl means
ｾ
g. > 0, for i = 1, 2, ... , N.
ｾ
Given A:: {a., j = 1,2, .•. , M} is the set of certain
J
alternatives under consideration, the following result, proven
ｾ ｮ Keeney [1972] in the context of multiattribute utility and
in Keeney and Kirkwood [1973J in a group decision context
holds.
(5)
Theorem 1. If assumption Cl is satisfied, then the group
cardinal utility function u G defined by
u G( a j) = u [ u 1 (a j ), u 2 ( a j ), ... , uN ( a j )] can be
calculated from
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•• " uN) =
N
L
i=l
k.u. +
1 1
N
L
i=l
R.>i
+ k 12 u l ••.• •• N
where
(1) u i ' i = 1,2, ... , N, is scaled from zero to one
for the set of alternatives,
(2) u is scaled by u(O, 0, ••• , 0) = ° and
u(l, 1, "', 1) = 1,
(6)
(3) k. > 0, for i = 1, 2, "', N, and
1
(4) k. +
1
N
L
i=l
R.> i
m>R.
k i R. m + ••• + k 12 .•• N >0, for i = 1 , 2 , ... ,N .
Condition (4) of the theorem follows from (5)
be positive.
since g. must
1
The interesting fact about u in (6) is that it satisfies
the conditions Bl - B5 which are analogous to Arrow's
assumptions. Assumption Bl is clearly met, and since from
(5), au/au. = g. > 0, for all i, Assumption B2 is also
1 1
satisfied. B4 and B5 are consistent with (6) for the same
reasoning as discussed in the last section. The only
assumption which is not clearly satisfied is B3.
If an alternative is eliminated from consideration for
which u. is not equal to zero or one, then of course we have
1
the same utility function as in (6) so the remaining alter-
natives have the same utility as previously and B3 is met.
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The difficulty occurs if an alternative is eliminated for
which u. is zero or one for some i.
ｾ
We can consider all
cases sequentially so assume two alternatives have been
eliminated from consideration for which u =1 o for one of
Now we wish to find a newthese and u l = 1 for the other.
group utility function u' defined on the utilities of
alternatives denoted by ui, u z, ... ,- u' where the ｵ ｾ areN ｾ
let me
i = 2, 3,foru! = u.
ｾ ｾ
Thus, we have
NoteN •.. . , that usually there will be amounts of u l '
call them u1 and u!, where 0 < u1 < u! < 1, which now
scaled from zero to one.
coincide with ui = 0 and 1 respectively*. By this, we mean
Assumptionu l for some alternative a was ｵ ｾ and ui for a is O.
Cl must still hold so the group utility function u' must be
of the form
•• " ｵｾＩ =
N
L
i=l
k! u! +
ｾ ｾ
N
L
i=l
R.>i
• •• N u'1 u'N (7)
as in Theorem 1. In order for u and u' to give equivalent
utilities to all possible alternatives, they must be equivalent
utility functions. Hence, since cardinal utility functions
are unique up to positive linear transformation, the question
is where or not a Al and A2 > 0 exist such that
(8)
*This case where individual II ends up indifferent between
｡ ｬ ｾ the ｲ ･ ｾ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｾ ｧ ｡ ｾ ｴ ･ ｲ ｮ ａ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ Ｌ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｴ Ｌ ｾ ｳ where u1 = ut, isｵ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ･ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｧ ｳ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･ II's preferences-will have no effect on the
groups preferences.
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where both u' and u are scaled zero to one consistent with
(7) and (6) respectively. But we know that
u'(O, 0, ... ,0) = ° = Al + A2 u(u1>0, ... ,0)
and
u'(1, 1, ... ,1) = 1 = Al + A2 u(u!. 1 •..•• 1)
(9)
(10)
if such a Al and A2 exist. Since we can just solve (6) for
. 0 0. 0) and u(u!. 1 , 1). these can be substitutedu(u l • ... , ... ,
into (9) and (10) to give us numerically values of Al and A2·
From this all the k!, ｫ ｾ .• and so on of (7) can be evaluated
1. 1.J
directly from (6) by using (8). Thus. if scaling is consistently
handled. Assumption B3 is satisfied by (6).
Now let us look at a stronger assumption than Cl. which is
a natural extension of the premise.
Assumption C2. In situations where the utilities of N-2 of
the individuals are fixed for two alternatives.
the utilities of the two remaining individuals
shall guide the group decisions.
In a logical manner similar to the way we arrived at (5) as a
mathematical statement of Assumption Cl. a mathematical
statement of Assumption C2 is
u. l'J+ ... ,
... ,
h .. (u., u.), for i = 1.2 ••..• N,j>i,
1. J L J
(11)
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where g .. > O. As proven in Keeney [1974J in the context
1.J
of multiattribute utility theory, we have
Theorem 2. If Assumption C2 is satisfied, then the group
cardinal utility function u G defined by
.
u G ( a j) == u [ u 1 (a j ), u 2 ( a j ), .,., uN ( a j ) J can be
evaluated from
N
L
i=l
k.u.
1. 1.
N
+ k L kiktuiu t + •••i=l
t>i
where
(l) u. is scaled from zero to one for the set of
1.
alternatives,
(2) u is scaled by u(O, 0, •• " 0) = ° and
u(l, 1, ,." 1) = 1,
(3) k.
1.
> 0, i = 1, 2, ... , N, and
(4) k = 0, if
N
L
i=l
k. =
1.
1, and k is the solution to
1 + k =
N
11"
i=l
(1 + kk.), if
1.
N
r
i=l
k. -j: 1 •
1.
Note that (12) is a special case of (6) proving that Assumption
C2 is in fact stronger than Cl. Also of interest is that if
k = 0, then (12) is the additive form
... , uN) =
N
L
i=l
k. U.
1. 1.
(l3)
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and if k I 0, we can multiply (12) by k, add 1, and factor
to obtain the multiplicative form of the group utility
function
•.. , uN) =
N
1T (1 + kk.u.)
i=l ｾ ｾ
(4)
Since (12) is a special case of (6) and (6) satisfies
Assumptions Bl - B5, then clearly (12) does also.
Let us investigate the implications of one more assumption.
Assumption C3. In situations where the utilities of N-2 of
the individuals are fixed for two alternatives,
the group should be indifferent if individually,
each of other two individuals is indifferent.
A mathematical statement equivalent to Assumption C3 is
that the two lotteries
u., u.. )
J ｾｊ
ｵｾＬ u.. )
J ｾｊ
and
ｵ ｾ Ｌ u.. )
J ｾｊ
u., u .. )
J ｾｊ
where u ij :: (u l ' ••• , u i - l '
must be indifferent for all
... , u. l'J-
u .. , u., u., u!,
ｾ ｊ ｾ J ｾ
u j +l' ..• , uN)
u!. Notice that with
J
each lottery, individual I. has the same expected utility
ｾ
and individual I. has the same expected utility.
J
Theorem 3. If Assumption C3 is satisfied, the group cardinal
utility function u G defined by
-16-
uc(a j ) = u[ul(a j ), u 2 (a j ), ..• , uN(aj)]-can be evaluated
from
where
N
L
i=l
k.u.
1 1
(15)
(1) u. 1S scaled from zero to one for the set of
1
alternatives,
(2) u is scaled by u(O, 0, .... , 0) = 0 and
u(l, 1, ... , 1) = 1, and
( 3) k.
1
> 0, i = 1, 2, ••• , N, with
N
L
i=l
k.
1
1 •
This result was first proven by Harsanyi [1955] and is very
similar to a proof by Fishburn [1965J in a multiattribute
utility context. Obviously (15) is a special case of (6)
and as such, it satisfies the Assumptions Bl - B5. The power
of the apparently innocuous Assumption C3 stems from the
fact that it assumes the "balance" of utiiities among the
individual is unimportant. This was not implied by either
Assumption Cl or Assumption C2.
5. Interpretation and Assessment of the Group
Utility Functions
The assessments necessary to implement the formulations
of the last section come from different sources for the two
versions--the benevolent dictator and the participatory
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group--of group decision problems defined at the beginning
of the paper. In both cases the cardinal utilities of the
certain alternatives come from the individuals who make up
the groups; each invidivual articulates his own utilities.
The more difficult assessments concern obtaining the scaling
constants, that is the k's in (6), (lZ), and (15). In the
benevolent dictator model, the benevolent dictator himself
must make these judgments, whereas the group as a whole must
assess the k's in the participatory group model.
Assessing the k's requires interpersonal comparison of
preferences. This is the heart of the issue. To be as simple
as possible and yet address the point, consider the benevolent
dictator who must assess the k's in (15). Since the
individual's utilities are scaled from zero to one, we can
arbitrarily set u(O, 0, "" 0) = 0 and u(l, 1, ... , 1) = 1,
where u is actually the benevolent dictator's utility function.
Thus, the benevolent dictator must consider questions like
which of (1, 0, 0) or (0, 1, 0, ••• , 0) he prefers. It
is easily to show from (15) that u(l, 0, •.• , 0) = k l and
u(O, 1, 0, •.. , 0) = k Z so if the former is preferred, then
With similar considerations, a ranking of the k. can
1
be developed. These considerations are not easy since the
benevolent dictator must conjur up in his mind what a u l = 0
and a u l = 1 means to individual II and what a Uz = 0 and
U z = 1 means to I Z ' and then superimpose his own value
structure about how important he thinks it is to change u l
-18-
from 0 to 1 versus u 2 from 0 to 1, etc. Suppose k l is
greater than k 2 , then the benevolent dictator must ask
himself, how much u l ' call it ut is such that
("u* 01 ' , . .. , 0)
is indifferent to (0, 1, 0, ..." 0) • By using (15) and
equating utilities of these circumstances, we find klut = k 2 •
A similar procedure is repeated for each of the u. 's which
1
provides us with a set of N-l equations and
k. ' s .
1
From Theorem 3, the Nth equation is
N
N
r
i=l
unknowns, the
k. = 1 from
1
which the values of the k. 's can be found.
1
The same type of thinking must be followed in the
participatory group decision model by each of the individuals
in the group. However, in addition, they must somehow
arr1ve at a concensus for the k's. Sometimes this may not
be possible and thus the model could not be used as intended.
When one uses the more general utility functions (6) and (12)
rather than (15), it is necessary that the assessors consider
impacts on two or more individuals at a time in order to
arrive at the scaling factors. That is, in general, one must
find pairs of circumstances (ui, u 2' ... , ｵｾＩ and
( u"1 ' u"2 ' ... , un)N for which the assessor is indifferent. Then
..• , ｵｾＩ = u (u 'i, u2' n)••• , UN gives us
one equation with the number of unknowns equal to the number
of scaling constants. The idea is to generate the number of
independent equations equal to the number of scaling constants
and then solve for them. Kirkwood [1972] discusses assessment
of the scaling constants in more detail.
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It is a difficult problem for the decision maker--the
benevolent dictator in the benevolent dictator model or
the group as a whole in the participatory group mode1--to
make the requisite interpersonal comparisons of utility. An
excellent discussion of this issue is found in Harsanyi
[1974]. We made no pretence that interpersonal utility
comparisons are easy, but they are often implicitly made
in group decisions. When one can formalize this aspect of
the process, the group utility functions discussed in this
paper do provide a means for integrating these preferences
which satisfies many reasonable conditions.
-20-
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